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Abstract 
Two studies demonstrate that members of high-status groups (i.e., men and students of 
business administration) but not members of low-status groups (i.e., women and education 
students) react with an increase in state self-esteem after an alleged poor performance on a 
fictitious intelligence test. This Failure-as-an-Asset (FA) effect is only observed when the 
high-status ingroup (i.e., men) is outperformed by a low-status outgroup (i.e., women). In this 
case, a poor performance will lead to a strong identification with the ingroup due to high 
ingroup prototypicality. As predicted, the effects of experiencing success or failure on self-
esteem were mediated by identification with the ingroup.   
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Introduction 
There is little doubt that individuals in contemporary western societies are supposed to 
strive for and enjoy success, and that success feels good. A person who succeeds in his or her 
occupation, in school, on a task, or on a specific test is very likely to feel better about himself 
or herself than a person who fails. However, we believe that there are certain conditions under 
which failure might actually lead to positive self evaluations and positive state self-esteem. 
Why should failure sometimes feel good? We predict that people will show enhanced 
feelings of personal worth after receiving negative individual performance feedback when this 
negative performance signifies that they are a prototypical member of a high-status group. 
Consider the case of a man who receives feedback that he has done poorly on a test of current 
fashion styles. He might be inclined to react positively to his own bad performance because 
he knows that women in general outperform men in this performance domain. It is therefore 
typical of a “real” man to fail in this kind of task.  
Following this line of reasoning, the prediction that failing sometimes feels good will be 
based on previous research that has shown that (1) self esteem will be affected not only by 
individual performance feedback, but also by factors related to group membership or social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Hogg, 2005), with the consequence that (2) individual failure 
or success may inform people about their ingroup prototypicality (Reinhard, Stahlberg, & 
Messner, 2008). 
How success and failure affects self-evaluation and self-esteem 
In general, failure in self-relevant domains has been shown to diminish state self-esteem, 
whereas success in such domains has been shown to increase state self-esteem (e.g., Crocker, 
Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 
2002; Dittes, 1969). Thus, because state self-esteem is sensitive to positive and negative 
performance feedback (i.e., success or failure; e.g., Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004), people try 
to overcome personal failures, for example, by engaging in self-serving information 
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processing. They try to distance themselves from failure and associate themselves with 
success by attributing the former to external factors, but claim (sometimes unwarranted) 
personal responsibility for the latter (e.g., Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990; 
Dauenheimer, Stahlberg, Frey & Petersen, 2002). They also tend to protect self-esteem via 
favorable social comparisons or ingroup identification (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 
1984; Wood, 1989). 
However, although individual success and failure can be conceived as exerting strong 
influences on self-esteem, they are certainly not the only impact factors.  Social identity 
theory has proposed membership in social groups of different social status as a second major 
source of self-esteem. 
Self-evaluation, self-esteem, and social identity 
High self-esteem will follow from being a member of a high-status group: Mere membership 
in high-status or privileged groups implies an array of social, affective, self-evaluation and 
economic advantages (e.g., high self-esteem, higher incomes, social acceptance, prestige) 
(Abrams, & Hogg, 2001; Hogg, & Abrams, 1988). Members of high-status groups are 
perceived as more worthy and competent, evoke more positive attitudes, possess more social 
and economic power, and are less likely to become victims of prejudice and personal 
discrimination than members of groups with lower social status (e.g., Crocker, Major, & 
Steele, 1998; Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 2002). People 
therefore strive to affiliate with successful others (e.g., basking in reflective glory; Cialdini, 
Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976), try to be part of groups that are positively 
distinct from other groups in status, prestige, and social valence (see e.g., Hogg, 2006), and 
are inclined to see groups they belong to as superior to other groups (Lau & Russell, 1980; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
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The self-concept benefits of being a member of a high status group will be enhanced 
even more by being a very typical member of such a group (e.g., Barkow, 1975; Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). According to self categorization theory (e.g., 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, Wetherell, 1987), social categories or groups are represented 
in terms of prototypes - “fuzzy sets of attributes (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors) 
that simultaneously capture similarities among group members and differences between 
members of one group and another group” (Hogg, 2005, p 245). These prototypes constitute 
group norms (e.g., Turner, 1991) by describing how members typically are and prescribing 
how members typically ought to be. In order to maintain the positivity and distinctiveness of a 
group, people pay close attention to the group prototype, with the consequence that those who 
deviate from the group’s norms are downgraded or excluded, while those who fit the group 
prototype closely (i.e., central members, high prototypicality) are upgraded and imbued with 
status, popularity, and social influence (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006; Hogg, 2001, 
2005). The importance of group prototypicality is also highlighted by the fact that even highly 
successful people (i.e., over-achievers or ‘‘tall-poppies’’), an example of positive deviants, 
are not liked very much and often evoke feelings of malicious pleasure if they experience 
failure (i.e., schadenfreude) (e.g., Feather, 1994; Feather & Sherman, 2002; see also Leach, 
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). In most cases, neither positive nor negative deviants 
contribute to a consensual prototype or to the entitativity of the group (e.g., Hogg, 2005).  
In sum, social identities can serve positive self-views best under the following two 
conditions: (1) the ingroup is positively distinct from relevant outgroups in a given 
comparative context, and (2) individuals are very close to the prototype of this group, i.e. they 
possess relative ingroup prototypicality. Therefore, the final question to be addressed here is 
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Prototypicality following personal failure: when failing feels good 
Reinhard et al. (2008) have presented some evidence that failure can become an asset when 
people are evaluated by others in terms of future career success (Failure-as-an-Asset effect). 
Participants in their experiments had to evaluate a target person (e.g., a man or woman) on the 
basis of her or his score in a test on logical reasoning or innovative thinking. At the same 
time, participants received feedback on the alleged average test scores of the ingroup of the 
target (e.g., men or women) and an outgroup (women or men). The Failure-as-an-Asset effect 
occurred for high-status targets (i.e., male targets):  a male stimulus person who failed in a test 
on innovative thinking in which women outperformed men was perceived as a prototypical 
exemplar of the high-status group “men.” High occupational success was then attributed to 
him. In contrast, low-status targets (i.e., women) did not profit from individual failure, unless 
sufficient individuating information was available that rendered the low-status target 
explicitly typical for the high-status group. 
These studies clearly show that under certain conditions, failure can lead to positive 
evaluations when people are asked to judge others. At this point, however, these findings 
cannot be expected to automatically generalize to intrapersonal reactions to own poor 
performances. Whereas evaluating unknown and unrelated others might be based solely on 
so-called cold cognitions (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Tetlock & Levi, 1982), reacting to 
personal success or failure might involve affects such as experiencing anxiety or shame, or 
evoke motives of self-esteem protection and self-defense (Weiner, 1985). After all, failure is 
often highly self-threatening as well as strongly affect-laden information.  
Taking these differences into account, we still propose that individual failure might lead to 
positive consequences, such as an enhanced feeling of self-esteem, under the conditions 
outlined above. Given that affiliations with successful others - or in a more general sense, 
membership in a high status or privileged group - combined with the status within the group 
(e.g., group prototypicality) will affect one’s self-esteem, any performance or behavior that 
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makes one prototypical of a high-status ingroup should elevate self-esteem. Thus, we suggest 
that even personal failures in self-relevant tasks might enhance self-esteem if failing renders 
one prototypical of a high-status group. This should be the case if one fails in a domain or 
task in which a low-status group in general outperforms the high status group. For example, 
after failing in the feminine domain of fashion judgments, men, though they have an obvious 
shortcoming, might feel comfortable because they see themselves as very masculine. They are 
expected to react with an increase in state self-esteem due to the fact that they performed in a 
way that is highly prototypical for men, a high status group. 
Previous studies have already shown that domains in which higher status groups excel 
are usually valued highly, whereas domains in which lower status groups excel are devalued 
and regarded as having no or little utility for gaining status-relevant rewards (e.g., Schmader, 
Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). Such an effect would result in stronger effects of success 
and failure on dimensions in which the high-status group outperforms the low status group. 
The present research hypotheses, however, will go one step further and argue that the effects 
of failing in a low-status domain go beyond this general principle. Instead of becoming 
merely unimportant or trivial because of the devaluation of the domain, our hypothesis is that 
such a failure by a member of the high status group will have positive effects in so far as it 
triggers the attribution of high prototypicality for this ingroup. This attribution will then lead 
to highly positive self-evaluations, as has been discussed before (see, e.g., Barkow, 1975; 
Hogg, 2001, 2005; Leary & Downs, 1995; Srivastava, & Beer, 2005).  
Women (or in a more general sense, low-status persons), on the other hand, should 
feel discomfort following individual failure regardless of the sex-typedness of the domain in 
question. No Failure-as-an-Asset effect should occur. Though failure in a male domain should 
maintain social (gender) identity (i.e, perceiving oneself as typically feminine; see e.g., Bem 
& Lenney, 1976), the lower social status of the social group is unlikely to buffer ego-threat 
because it is nothing to be especially proud of. Furthermore, women who fail in a feminine 
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domain might suffer social identity threat because they are led to perceive themselves as 
distinct from their ingroup. In addition, it is not expected that women will perceive 
themselves as typical for the (high-status) outgroup under that condition, as the studies of 
Reinhard et al. have suggested: at least in the context of  interpersonal performance 
evaluations, it obviously requires more evidence for an outgroup member to become 
prototypical for this group than a mere incident of failure. Positive attributes associated with 
the high-status outgroup are therefore unlikely to bolster self-esteem for women in this case.   
 
Overview of the experiments 
Individual success and failure and the social valence of own group membership are 
both important factors that are expected to determine one’s self-evaluation and self-esteem. 
Based on previous findings discussed above, we predict that high-status group members will 
react with an increase in state self-esteem following a negative performance if this failure 
renders the person prototypical of the high-status group s/he belongs to. The proposed effect 
of failure on state self-esteem in a low-status domain is therefore expected to be mediated by 
the tendency of high-status targets to identify strongly with their high-status ingroup, thereby 
not only counteracting ego threat, but boosting self-esteem because of high perceived 
prototypicality. 
We tested these assumptions in two experiments based on an experimental design 
developed by Leutze (1995) in an unpublished diploma thesis at the University of Mannheim. 
Participants were provided with false feedback about their own performance (positive vs. 
negative), as well as false feedback about the performances of a self-relevant high-status 
group and a low-status group in general (high-status group outperforms low-status group and 
vice versa) on an alleged intelligence test measuring innovative thinking. Participants were 
natural members of either the low-status group or high-status group. This procedure was the 
same across both studies. While we used gender categories in Experiment 1 to vary 
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differences in social status, in Experiment 2 we used two other groups differing in social 




Subjects and Design 
A total of 83 students (44 female and 39 male) at a German university participated in 
the experiment which was labeled “intelligence and environment” (mean age: 23.54). Each 
subject was randomly assigned to experimental conditions in a 2 (individual feedback: 
negative versus positive) x 2 (relative gender performance: men better versus women better) x 
2 (sex of participant) factorial design. The experiment lasted approximately 25 minutes and 
was conducted in single sessions. 
Procedure and Material 
Participants were informed that the experiment dealt with innovative thinking, 
introduced as one of the core components of general intelligence. Participants were told that 
the German Department for Research and Intelligence had recently developed a standardized 
test to measure innovative thinking (fictitious test: ATLG1), and that it had been validated in   
a sample of 5,000 people. 
After the presentation of this information, participants were instructed that they would 
have to perform the computer-based version of the ATLG1. They were further instructed that 
they would get immediate feedback about their performance and some reference scores 
consisting of average scores of some norm populations. Finally, they were told that they 
would have to answer a few questions about the test and their own performance on it. The 
ATLG1 actually consisted of 13 matrices derived from the advanced progressive matrices 
intelligence test (Raven, 1998; Heller,Kratzmeier, & Lengfelder, 1998). Raven's Progressive 
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Matrices are non-verbal intelligence tests, where one is asked to find the missing part required 
to complete a pattern. The patterns get progressively harder to complete, requiring more and 
more cognitive capability. After performing the ALTG1, participant’s fictitious individual test 
score was displayed on the middle part of the screen. In addition, the average test scores of 
women and men were both presented on the lower part of the screen. 
We manipulated participants’ individual performance by reporting either a high 
individual score (75 out of 100 points) or a low individual score (55 points). The group 
performances of women and men (i.e. relative gender performance) were manipulated by 
reporting either that women allegedly outperformed men on the ATLG1 (women-better 
condition: 71 vs. 59 points), or that men allegedly outperformed women (men-better 
condition). For example, participants in the women-better condition who received false 
feedback that they had performed poorly read the following information: “Your test score on 
the ATLG1 is: 55 points. Women generally received an average test score of 71 points, 
compared to an average score of 59 points for men.” To ensure that participants paid close 
attention to this information, they were asked to copy the test scores from the screen to a 
response sheet, ostensibly to facilitate data analysis. Before responding to the dependent 
measures, participants had to hand this response sheet to the experimenter.  
Measures 
Participants responded to all items on 8-point scales ranging from “strongly disagree” 
(1) to “strongly agree” (8). We measured participant’s state self-esteem with six items taken 
from Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) subscale performance (Cronbach’s alpha = .85): “I feel 
confident about my abilities;” “I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance;” “I feel as 
smart as others;” “I feel confident that I understand things;” “I feel that I have less scholastic 
ability right now than others;” and “I feel like I’m not doing well.” Global self-esteem was 
assessed with the following three items taken from Rosenberg (1989; Cronbach’s alpha = 
.80): “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself,” “At times, I think I am no good at all,” “I 
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feel that I have a number of good qualities.” We then assessed participant’s identification with 
her or his own gender category with four items adapted from Luthanen and Crocker’s (1992) 
subscale identity taken from their collective self-esteem scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84): 
“Overall, my gender has very little to do with how I feel about myself;” “The gender I belong 
to is an important reflection of who I am;” “The gender I belong to is unimportant to my sense 
of what kind of a person I am;” and “In general, belonging to social groups is an important 
part of my self-image.”  Finally, participants had the opportunity to write down what they 
believed the study was aiming at. At the end of the experiment participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and dismissed by a research assistant. 
Results 
Because analyses of the final statements indicated that ten participants became suspicious of 
the experimental procedure, they were excluded from further analyses.1 Unless otherwise 
noted, the data of 83 subjects were analyzed using 2 (relative gender performance) x 2 
(individual performance) x 2 (sex of participants) univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
Following our hypotheses, we expected significant three-way interactions on both 
participant’s state self-esteem as well as on their collective self-esteem, but not on global self-
esteem. Specifically, male participants should react with an increase in state self-esteem after 
successful rather than unsuccessful performance in the men-better condition, whereas the 
reverse should be true in the women-better condition. Female participants should only react 
with an increase in self-esteem following successful performance in either of the relative 
gender performance conditions. An identical pattern was expected for participants’ 
identification with their own sex, which, in turn, should function as a mediator for the effects 
on state self-esteem. Global self-esteem, by contrast, should be unaffected by the 
manipulations, because global self-esteem is conceptualized as a stable trait that does not 
strongly fluctuate over time and situations (Block & Robins, 1993). However, the global self-
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esteem measure was included to rule out the possibility that the manipulations will affect any 
variable in the same way. 
State self-esteem 
The first section of Table 1 displays participants’ state self-esteem as a function of 
relative gender performance, individual performance, and sex of participant. Results show 
that participants who allegedly performed individually well reported higher state self-esteem 
than those who alledgedly performed individually poorly (4.63 vs. 4.04; F(1, 75) = 8.56, p < 
.005). Furthermore, the interaction of individual performance with sex of target was 
marginally significant (F(1, 75) = 3.41, p < .07). While female participants reported higher 
state self-esteem when they received positive compared to negative feedback (4.81 vs. 3.83), 
F(1, 75) = 12.61, p < .001, male participants showed no difference in state self-esteem 
between conditions (4.42 vs. 4.26; F < 1). A significant individual performance x relative 
gender performance interaction occurred, F(1, 75) = 18.41, p < .001, indicating that, given the 
men-better condition, participants with positive compared to negative feedback reported 
higher state self-esteem (5.13 vs. 3.72, F(1, 75) = 26.11, p < .001). In the women-better 
condition there was no difference between conditions (4.04 vs. 4.38; p > .25). These effects, 
however, were qualified by the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 75) = 8.37, p < .01. 
Supplementary analyses were conducted to identify differences in the responses of male vs. 
female participants depending on the manipulations. 
Focusing on male participants only, the predicted interaction of relative gender 
performance and individual performance was significant, (F(1, 35) = 19.24, p < .001). Results 
indicated higher state self-esteem in case of positive compared to negative individual 
feedback in the men better-condition (5.26 vs. 3.65), F(1, 35) = 11.58, p < .005, r = .50. By 
contrast, in the women-better condition, negative rather than positive individual feedback led 
to higher state self-esteem (4.93 vs. 3.57), F(1, 35) = 7.91, p < .01, r = .40.  
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Focussing on female participants only, a significant main-effect of individual 
performance was found, F(1, 42) = 17.09, p < .001, indicating higher state self-esteem after 
positive than negative individual feedback (4.81 vs. 3.83). The interaction of relative gender 
performance and individual performance was not significant, (p > .18).  
Participants’ identification with their own gender category 
Table 1 (second section) displays participants’ identification with their own gender 
category as a function of relative gender performance, individual performance, and sex of 
participant. Results show the following two significant interactions: individual performance x 
sex of target (F(1, 75) = 4.14, p < .05), and individual performance x relative gender 
performance (F(1, 75) = 5.29, p < .05). The two-way interactions in detail: while male 
participants reported higher identification with their gender category in case of negative 
compared to positive individual feedback (4.36 vs. 3.41; F(1, 75) = 4.74, p < .05), female 
participants showed no difference between conditions (3.84 vs. 3.48; F < 1). Participants who 
received negative individual feedback reported higher identification than those who received 
positive individual feedback in the women-better condition (4.31 vs. 3.43; F(1, 75) = 4.07, p 
< .50). No difference was found in the men-better condition (3.36 vs. 3.96, p > .15). In line 
with our assumptions, these effects were qualified by the significant three-way interaction 
(F(1, 75) = 11.24, p < .005). Here, too, supplementary analyses were conducted to identify 
differences in the responses of male vs. female participants. 
Focussing on male participants only, the interaction of relative gender performance 
and individual performance was again significant, F(1, 35) = 36.03, p < .001, indicating 
higher gender identification in case of positive compared to negative individual feedback in 
the men-better condition (4.19 vs. 2.77; F(1, 35) = 10.66, p < .005, r = .45). By contrast, in 
the women-better condition, higher gender identification was reported following negative 
compared to positive individual feedback (5.45 vs. 3.14), F(1, 35) = 27.00, p < .001, r = .66. 
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A supplementary analysis focussing on female participants showed no significant effects (F < 
1). 
Global self-esteem 
Besides a marginal significant main effect of sex of participant (female participants: 
6.55 versus male participants 5.95; F(1, 75) = 3.89, p < .06) there was no significant effect (p 
> .17). Overall, participants’ global self-esteem was quite high (M = 6.25). 
Mediation of the FA-effect 
While the interaction of relative gender performance and individual performance was only 
assumed and found for male participants, the following mediational analyses were only run 
for this gender group. We conducted regression analyses proposed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) in order to test that the effects found on male participants’ state self-esteem are 
mediated by males’ tendencies to identify more or less strongly with their gender category 
depending on the manipulations.  
The two-way interaction of relative gender performance x individual performance 
predicted state self-esteem (β = .85, p < .001) and gender identification (β = 1.24, p < .001) in 
step one. Gender identification predicted state self-esteem in step two (β = .55, p < .001), and 
in step three, the relationship between the two-way interaction and state self-esteem was 
reduced to non-significance when state self-esteem was regressed on the two-way interaction 
and gender identification (β = .31, p > .10). In addition, Sobel's test (Sobel, 1982) indicated 
that the mediator (gender identification) carries the influence of the two-way interaction on 
prediction of state self esteem (z = 3.39, p < .001). A reverse mediation was not found.2 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 indicates that negative performance feedback can lead to increases in state 
self-esteem, a finding opposing the idea that failure in self-relevant domains always threatens 
self-esteem (e.g., Crocker et al., 2003; Crocker & Park, 2004). We found negative feedback or 
perceived failure to be associated with high state self-esteem if male participants got negative 
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feedback about their performance on a test in which women in general were reported to 
outperform men (i.e., women better condition). In this case, state self-esteem was equally as 
high as state self-esteem after success in a male domain (i.e., men better condition). As 
expected, this effect was mediated by how strongly male participants identified with the male 
gender category. 
By contrast, women did not profit affectively from failure in a cross-sexed domain and 
only indicated a higher state self-esteem when receiving positive individual feedback. This 
effect was independent of identification tendencies with the female gender category. In fact, 
women felt most positively about themselves when they were led to believe that they 
performed well on a test in which men in general outperform women. (Although they might 
feel more pleased by the positive feedback if men in general outperform women because here 
the dimension carried greater social valence, as has been outlined above, or because they have 
obviously overcome the handicap or stigma of being a low-performing woman; Crocker et al., 
1998). This, however, supports the notion that domains in which high-status groups excel are 
of high social valence (e.g., Ridgeway, 1991), with the consequence that being good in those 
domains does permit some positive individual outcomes. 
As a result, Experiment 1 offers clear support for our hypothesis that personal failure can 
serve positive self-evaluative functions if it renders men prototypical of the male gender 
category. Up to this point, however, we do not know whether this effect holds beyond the 
gender context. Thus, in Experiment 2 we will try to replicate these findings using other 
groups/categories which differ in social status.  
Experiment 2 
We decided to select groups of students from different majors (students of business 
administration vs. teaching students). Students of business administration, representing a high 
status group, should exibit the same tendency as male participants in Experiment 1. They are 
expected to profit affectively from negative individual feedback  when the test is presented as 
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showing better overall scores for teaching students (i.e., representing a low status group). By 
contrast, teaching students  are expected to show an increase in state self-esteem only after 
positive rather than negative performance feedback. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
One hundred-and-ninety-eight German university students  participated in the 
experiment that was labelled “intelligence and environment” (mean age: 23.26). Subjects 
were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in a 2 (individual feedback: negative 
versus positive) x 2 (relative group performance: high status group [business students] better 
vs. low status group [teaching students] better ) x 2 (group membership of participant: 
business student vs. teaching student) factorial design. Participant’s sex was included as a 
control variable. A pretest had shown business students and teaching students vary in their 
perceived status among students: independent of participants’ sex, the status of the business 
students was judged higher than the status of the teaching students, F(1, 24) = 25.75, p < .001, 
r = .72. The experiment was run in single sessions and lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
Design and Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that in Experiment 1, except that average test scores 
on the ATLG1 were attributed to business students vs. teaching students, instead of women 
and men. Subjects were teaching students and business students. The sex of the stimulus 
person was counterbalanced. At the end of the experiment, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and dismissed by a research assistant. 
Material 
Participants responded to all items on 8-point scales ranging from “strongly disagree” 
(1) to “strongly agree” (8). We measured participant’s state-self esteem (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.63) and global self-esteem (Cronbach’s alpha = .78) with the items already used in 
Experiment 1. We assessed participant’s identification with her or his own field of study with   
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items adapted from Luthanen and Crocker’s (1992) subscale identity from their collective self-
esteem scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .80): “Overall, my field of study has very little to do with 
how I feel about myself;”  “The field of study I belong to is an important reflection of who I 
am;”  “The field of study I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I 
am;” and “In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.”  
Finally, participants had the opportunity to write down what they believed the study was 
aiming at. 
Results and Discussion 
Unless noted otherwise, the data of 198 subjects were analyzed by 2 (relative group 
performance) x 2 (individual feedback) x 2 (group membership of participants) univariate 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Because there were no reliable effects of participant’s sex, 
the data were pooled over this variable. 
State self-esteem 
The first section of Table 2 displays participants’ state self-esteem as a function of 
relative group performance, individual performance, and group membership. Results showed 
that participants with positive compared to negative individual feedback reported higher state 
self-esteem (4.92 vs. 4.49), F(1, 190) = 9.84, p < .005. Two significant two-way interactions 
occurred. First, teaching students reported higher state self-esteem after positive compared to 
negative individual feedback (5.06 vs. 4.24), F(1, 190) = 12.61, p < .001. By contrast, for 
business students there was no difference between conditions (4.80 vs. 4.76; F < 1), resulting 
in a significant individual performance x group membership interaction, F(1, 190) = 8.11, p < 
.01. Second, participants receiving positive compared to negative individual feedback 
reported higher state self-esteem in the business group-better condition (5.26 vs. 4.34), F(1, 
190) = 21.83, p < .001. No difference was found in this regard in the teaching  group-better 
condition (4.62 vs. 4.66, F < 1), resulting in a significant individual performance x relative 
group performance interaction (F(1, 190) = 12.15, p < .001). Again, these effects were 
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qualified by the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 190) = 4.13, p < .01. As in Experiment 
1, we conducted seperate analyses for business students vs. teaching students only. 
Given business students only, the interaction of relative group performance and 
individual performance was significant, F(1, 95) = 10.80, p < .001, a finding that is in accord 
with the results of Experiment 1. While higher state self-esteem was reported after positive 
compared to negative performance feedback in the business group-better condition (5.25 vs. 
4.44), F(1, 95) = 6.07, p < .05, r = .25, a higher state self-esteem was reported after negative 
compared to positive individual feedback in the teaching  group-better condition (5.10 vs. 
4.37), F(1, 95) = 4.82, p < .05, r = .22. Here, again, we found evidence that members of a 
high-status group (i.e., business students) react with an increase in state self-esteem after an 
alledged poor performance on a test where, on average, their high-status ingroup 
underperformed relative to a low status outgroup. Thus, across two experiments using 
different high-status groups, we found consistent support for our assumption that belonging to 
a high-status group can elevate feelings of self-worth after personal failure, if this failure 
renders oneself prototypical for one’s high-status ingroup. 
Again consistent with Experiment 1, the supplementary analysis conducted with 
teaching  students only showed a significant main effect of individual performance, F(1, 95) = 
29.89, p < .001. They reported higher state self-esteem after positive compared to negative 
individual feedback (5.06 vs. 4.24). Again, the interaction of relative group performance and 
individual performance failed to be significant, p > .17. In accord with the findings of 
Experiment 1, low-status persons did not show an increase in state self-esteem following an 
alledged poor performance. Overall, we found a pattern identical to that in Experiment 1. 
Ingroup Identification 
The second section of Table 2 displays participants’ identification with their field of 
study as a function of relative group performance, individual performance, and group 
membership of participants. Participants with negative compared to positive individual 
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feedback reported higher identification in the teaching group-better condition (4.71 vs. 4.03), 
F(1, 190) = 15.55, p < .001). No difference was found in the business group-better condition 
(4.21 vs. 4.52, p < .08), resulting in a significant individual performance x relative group 
performance interaction, F(1, 190) = 16.45, p < .001. This effect was qualified by the 
predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 190) = 16.46, p < .001. All other effects were not 
significant, p > 12. In subsequent supplementary analyses for business students vs. teaching 
students only, we replicated the findings of Experiment 1. 
As expected, for business students only the interaction of relative group performance 
and individual performance was significant, F(1, 95) = 20.74, p < .001. A higher ingroup 
identification was reported in case of positive compared to negative individual feedback in the 
business students-better condition (4.76 vs. 4.02; F(1, 95) = 5.87, p < .05, r = .24). By 
contrast, in the teaching students better-condition, a higher identification was reported after 
negative compared to positive individual feedback (5.11 vs. 3.88), F(1, 95) = 15.83, p < .001, 
r = .38. No significant effects were found for teaching students, all p > .20. In sum, while 
identification tendencies of high-status targets with their ingroup were determined by their 
individual performance relative to the average performances of the reference groups, low-
status targets’ identification with their ingroup was unaffected by our manipulations. These 
results are consistent with those of Experiment 1. 
Global self-esteem 
Again, we found no effects on participants’ global self esteem ratings, p > .17, 
indicating that stable aspects of people’s self-esteem were unaffected by our manipulations. 
Overall, participants reported a high global self-esteem (M = 6.21).  
Mediation of the FA-effect 
As the Failure-as-an-Asset effect occurred – as predicted – for business students only, 
we again ran a meditational analysis for this group only. The regression analyses for business 
students show that, in step one, the two-way interaction of relative group performance x 
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individual performance predicted participants state self-esteem (β = .55, p < .005) and 
identification with their field of study (β = .73, p < .001). Participants’ identification with 
their field of study predicted participants state self-esteem in a second step (β = .71, p < .001), 
and in step three, the relationship between the two-way interaction and predicted occupational 
success was reduced to nonsignificance when state self-esteem was regressed on the two-way 
interaction and identification with their field of study (β = .04, n.s.). In addition, Sobel's test 
(Sobel, 1982) indicated that the mediator (identification with their own group) carries the 
influence of the two-way interaction on prediction of state self esteem (z = 4.13, p < .001). No 
reverse mediation was found in this supplementary analysis.3  
General Discussion 
When and why failing feels good 
People want to believe in their skills and abilities, are inclined to maintain positive images 
about themselves, and want to be liked and appreciated by others (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; 
Leary & Downs, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988). It can be understood as a kind 
of truism in social psychology that individual success serves these goals much better than 
individual failure. However, as we have shown here, personal failures in self-relevant 
domains do not invaribly cause a drop in state self-esteem, just as failure does not invariably 
cause negative evaluations by others (see Reinhard et al., 2008). People who received 
negative feedback about their abilities in the domain of innovative thinking evaluated 
themselves fairly positively if they were led to believe that their performance was highly 
prototypical of their high social status ingroup. To be more concrete, men (business students) 
showed high self-esteem when they failed on a test of innovative thinking as long as they 
were convinced that men (business students) in general scored much lower than women 
(teaching students) in general. It is important to note that a positive social identity did not 
simply protect high-status people against the threat, but - in cases of high perceived 
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prototypicality –  actually led to a boost in state self-esteem. This boost in self-esteem was 
completely mediated by a strong identification with the ingroup. 
Taken together, these findings can best be interpreted in the light of social identity 
theory and self categorization theory (Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Hogg, 2001, 2005; Turner et 
al., 1987). Since feelings of self-worth have been shown to depend largely on affiliations with 
relevant social groups (Tropp & Wright, 2001), not only does mere membership represent a 
source for a positive self-view, but the more people comply with the requirements and norms 
necessary to become a central member of the group, the higher people advance in group 
hierarchies and the more they are imbued with popularity and social influence (Eidelman et 
al., 2006; Hogg, 2001, 2005). As a consequence, ingroup prototypicality fosters positive self 
evaluations (Anderson et al., 2006).  
When failing always hurts: The case of low-status group members 
 Members of low status groups (here: women or teaching students) did not profit from failure 
in terms of self-esteem enhancement in any of the experimental conditions. They always 
showed higher state self-esteem after success than after failure. In line with our predictions, 
failure of low status group members led neither to stronger identification with the ingroup, nor   
to a heightened state self-esteem. We predicted this data pattern because we assumed that a 
positive identification with a low-status ingroup has no protective function in case of personal 
failure because it does not offer a positive social identity.  
This assumption, however, cannot go undisputed, for some authors have strongly 
suggested that being a member of a low status or even stigmatized group can immunize 
people against negative individual feedback (Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999; Crocker 
& Major, 1989). Negative feedback can be qualified by focusing on mere ingroup 
comparisons (leading to a standard shift, Biernat & Thompson, 2002), or be attributed to 
prejudice based on the low social status or stigma associated with the ingroup. As a 
consequence, members of low status groups or even stigmatized groups very often do not 
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suffer from lower self-esteem. Moreover, recent research found that especially highly 
identified minority group members are relatively immune to losses of self-esteem under 
conditions of collective threat (Garcia & Cohen, 2005).  
In the present studies, we found no evidence that the effects of failure on self-esteem 
can be attenuated by the salience of poor performance of fellow group members of low status. 
However, the Crocker and Major (1989) argument may claim a certain validity regarding the 
success condition. In both experiments we found that with members of a low-status group, the 
highest state self-esteem can be observed  after a success on a dimension where the high-
status group outperformed the low-status group. Here, the success might have offered a very 
self-flatterung attribution of high abilities, because these participants did well despite their 
handicap or stigma of membership in a low-status group. We cannot, however, rule out at the 
present time that one will also find a Failure-as-an-Asset effect due to the positive effects of  
prototypicality and ingroup identification with members of low-status groups who strongly 
identify with their ingroup before receiving any performance feedback . We did not measure 
the overall identification with the own gender group or the fields of study and therefore we 
could not test this assumption.   
Further limitations and future Research 
The studies presented here found clear support for a Failure-as-an-Asset effect in the 
context of self-evaluations. Further analyses also supported the assumption that the effect was 
mediated by identification with the ingroup. However, alternative explanations for the effect 
should also be discussed. One might assume that the information of the relative gender 
performance can affect the importance attributed to the dimension of “logical thinking” or the 
estimated validity of the test used to measure innovative thinking: To begin with, people 
know that, in general, men are the more successful sex in the workplace. Next in the 
experiment, they learn that in the test on innovative thinking men score lower than women. 
To make sense of this somewhat contradictory information, participants may conclude that 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
24 When failing feels good 
either this specific ability cannot be very important or must even be an impediment to 
occupational success, or that the test is simply not valid or has a negative validity, 
respectively. Thereby, members of a high status group construe a low score as being 
objectively positive and end up with a positive self esteem. Although straightforward, this 
explanation cannot sufficiently account for the whole present data pattern. Such an argument 
should obviously hold for members of both the low and high status group. Scoring low on an 
ability that is an impediment to success should also be positive for members of the low-status 
group. Our results did not found such a positive effect of failure with low-status group 
members. Moreover, Stahlberg and Reinhard (2003) were able to show that the FA-effect 
could not be explained by the mediating variables “importance/impedimental quality of the 
task” in their person perception paradigm.  
Future research should also investigate possible moderaters of the Failure-as-an Asset-
effect. For example, it could be assumed that this effect is stronger for people who feel that 
their status within their group is threatened, or for those people who actually perceive their 
group prototypicality as low. Moreover, participants in the present study were mostly 
socialized within a Western European culture. It is an open question for future research 
whether the present theorizing will lead to valid predictions also in collectivistic cultures, 
where social identity might be even more salient than in individualistic cultures. Research by 
Heine and his colleagues (Heine & Lehman, 1995; Heine & Hamamura, 2007) has 
demonstrated that people with collectivistic backgrounds (e.g., Asians) will be less prone to 
use ingroup favorism in order to boost their self-esteem. This might suggest a reduced 
Failure-as-an-Asset effect in these cultures.  
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Table 1 
Means for reported state self-esteem and identification with one’s own gender group as a function of relative group performance, individual 
performance, and sex of participants (N = 83)  
                    
          Sex of Participant        
     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Female Participant     Male Participant 
     -------------------------------------------   --------------------------------------------   
Relative    Individually  Individually   individually  individually  
Gender Performance    good    poor    good    poor 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
State self-esteem 
Men are better   5.04 (12)  3.79 (12)   5.26 (9)  3.65 (11) 
Women are better  4.50 (9)  3.88 (11)   3.57 (9)  4.93 (10) 
Ingroup Identification  
Men are better   3.79 (12)  3.90 (12)   4.19 (9)  2.77 (11) 
Women are better  3.72 (9)  3.27 (11)   3.14 (9)  5.45 (10) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note. State self-esteem and identification with one’s own gender group were measured on 8-point Likert-type scales, with a higher mean expressing 
higher state self-esteem and stronger identification with one’s own group. 
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Table 2 
Means for reported state self-esteem and identification with one’s own group as a function of relative group performance, individual performance, 
and group membership of participants (N = 198)  
                    
        Group membership of Participant         
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Teaching students      BusinessStudents 
    ------------------------------------------   ------------------------------------------ 
Relative   Individually  Individually   individually  individually  




 are better  5.28 (22)  4.25 (27)   5.25 (25)  4.44 (25) 
Teaching students 
are better  4.87 (24)  4.24 (26)   4.37 (26)  5.10 (23) 
Ingroup Identification  
Business students 
are better  4.24 (22)  4.38 (27)   4.76 (25)  4.02 (25) 
Teaching students 
are better  4.19 (24)  4.33 (26)   3.88 (26)  5.11 (23) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note. State self-esteem and identification with one’s own group were measured on 8-point Likert-type scales, with a higher mean expressing higher 
state self-esteem and stronger identification with one’s own group.
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1 Analyses including the whole sample yielded no different results. 
2 If gender identification was alternatively regressed on the two-way interaction and state self-
esteem, the relationship between identification and the two-way interaction was only slightly 
reduced and remained highly significant (β = .50, p < .001). In steps one and two, 
respectively, the two-way interaction predicted identification (β = .67, p < .001), and state 
self-esteem predicted identification (β = .55, p < .001).  
3If identification was alternatively regressed on the two-way interaction and state self-esteem, 
the relationship between identification and the two-way interaction was still highly significant 
(β = .38, p < .001). In steps one and two, respectively, the two-way interaction predicted 
identification (β = .73, p < .001), and state self-esteem predicted identification (β = .71, p < 
.001). The results showed, in line with our assumptions, that the mediational effect of 
identification with ones own group on state self-esteem could be clearly confirmed, and that 
the reverse mediation was not found.  
  
